Ben Mene-Ejegi v LPDC: Can The National Assembly Confer Appellate Jurisdiction On The Supreme Court? -By Oluwaleye Adedoyin Grace

1. Introduction

Can the National Assembly confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court where the Constitution has not expressly granted it that power?

This question lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi Esq v Nigerian Bar Association & Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, SC/481/2018, delivered on 26 June 2026. The case presented the Court with more than a dispute arising from professional disciplinary proceedings. It required the apex Court to examine the constitutional foundation of a statutory provision that appeared to permit a direct appeal from the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) to the Supreme Court.

By a majority of five to two, the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a direct appeal and declared section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act void to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also departed from its earlier decision in Okike v LPDC, which had recognized the direct appellate route.

The decision therefore raises fundamental questions about constitutional supremacy, legislative competence, appellate jurisdiction and the doctrine of judicial precedent.

2. The Case — How Did We Get Here?

The controversy in Ben Mene-Ejegi Esq v Nigerian Bar Association & Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee began with a complaint of professional misconduct against the appellant, a legal practitioner practicing in Warri.

The complaint arose from a land transaction involving ₦1.6 million. It was alleged that Mene-Ejegi represented to one Tosan Olukpe that a parcel of land at Ajah-Etan Close, Warri, belonged to him and was available for sale. Olukpe paid the agreed sum, which Mene-Ejegi acknowledged on his law firm’s letterhead. When Olukpe subsequently attempted to develop the property, he allegedly discovered that the land did not belong to the appellant and was removed from it. Despite demands for a refund, the money was not fully returned.

The matter eventually proceeded before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC), which found Mene-Ejegi guilty on both counts. On 22 March 2018, the Committee directed that his name be struck off the Roll of Legal Practitioners and ordered him to refund the ₦1.6 million to Olukpe.

Mene-Ejegi challenged the decision by appealing directly to the Supreme Court. That appeal, however, raised a question far more fundamental than the allegations of professional misconduct: did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal directly from the LPDC in the first place? The answer to that question ultimately became the central issue before the apex Court.

3. The Statutory Foundation: Section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act

At the center of the controversy is section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA). The provision created a direct avenue of appeal against a direction or order of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) to the Supreme Court. It was this statutory provision that Mene-Ejegi relied upon when he challenged the decision of the LPDC before the apex Court.

On the face of the provision, therefore, the appellate route appeared straightforward:

LPDC to Supreme Court.

This statutory arrangement had also received judicial recognition, most notably in Okike v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, where the Supreme Court had previously accepted its jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the LPDC. The provision consequently operated for years as the statutory basis for bringing such disciplinary appeals directly before the Supreme Court.

However, the existence of a statutory right of appeal did not necessarily settle the question of constitutional competence. The critical issue was whether the National Assembly, through an ordinary Act, could confer upon the Supreme Court an appellate jurisdiction beyond the constitutional framework governing appeals to the apex Court.

That question required the Supreme Court to place section 12(7) of the LPA alongside the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, particularly sections 233, 240 and 1(3).

It was at this point that what appeared to be a simple statutory right of appeal became a question of constitutional supremacy.

4. The Constitutional Framework: Sections 233, 240 and 1(3)

The statutory provision could not be considered in isolation. Its validity had to be measured against the Constitution, which is the supreme law of Nigeria.

Section 233 of the Constitution sets out the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In its general appellate structure, appeals come to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal. The provision therefore places the Court of Appeal within the constitutional pathway through which ordinary appeals reach the apex Court.

Section 240, on the other hand, deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. It provides that the Court of Appeal may hear appeals from specified courts and from decisions of a court martial or other tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. This is significant because the Constitution expressly contemplates legislative involvement in determining additional tribunals from which appeals may lie to the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ben Mene-Ejegi therefore turned on the distinction between these two provisions. While the Constitution expressly permits legislation to prescribe additional sources of appeals to the Court of Appeal, the Court held that the National Assembly could not, by ordinary legislation, create a direct appellate route from the LPDC to the Supreme Court outside the constitutional framework. The Court consequently held section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act void to the extent that it purported to confer such jurisdiction.

This brings us to section 1(3) of the Constitution, which provides the constitutional consequence of inconsistency: where any other law is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution prevails and that other law is void to the extent of the inconsistency.

5. From Okike to Mene-Ejegi

The controversy in Ben Mene-Ejegi cannot be fully understood without tracing the earlier decisions on appeals from the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC).

The starting point is Charles Okike v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (No 1). In that case, the Supreme Court considered section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act by the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No 21 of 1994, alongside section 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the LPDC.

The position became complicated in Jide Aladejobi v Nigerian Bar Association. In Aladejobi, the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over a direct appeal from the LPDC, holding that the applicable Legal Practitioners Act required an aggrieved practitioner to first approach the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers. The Court’s reasoning was based on the provisions contained in the 2004 Revised Laws of the Federation.

This created an apparent tension with Okike. Indeed, when the issue came before the Supreme Court again in Rotimi Williams Akintokun v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, the appellant argued that Aladejobi had been decided per incuriam because Okike No 1 and the 1994 amendment had not been considered. The Court was therefore invited to depart from Aladejobi and restore the position in Okike.

The Court’s consideration of Akintokun revealed that the apparent conflict was partly rooted in the different legislative regimes applicable at different times. The 1994 amendment had substituted the Appeal Committee route with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, while the 2004 re-enactment restored the Appeal Committee mechanism. Consequently, the precise statutory regime applicable to the particular disciplinary proceedings became critical.

This history is significant because it demonstrates that the question of direct LPDC appeals had already generated conflicting judicial approaches before Mene-Ejegi. The Supreme Court was therefore not confronting an entirely new question. Rather, Mene-Ejegi brought the issue back to the Court at a point where the constitutional foundation of the direct appeal itself became the central concern.

The journey from Okike to Mene-Ejegi therefore reflects more than a change in judicial opinion. It reflects the interaction between successive amendments to the Legal Practitioners Act, competing judicial precedents and the constitutional limits of appellate jurisdiction.

6. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi

The Supreme Court, by a majority of five to two, held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from a direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC). The Court’s reasoning was anchored principally on the constitutional allocation of appellate jurisdiction.

The majority examined sections 233 and 240 of the 1999 Constitution together. Section 233 establishes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, while section 240 permits the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to extend to other courts and tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. The Court considered the difference in the constitutional treatment of the two appellate courts significant.

In the Court’s view, the Constitution expressly permits the National Assembly to expand the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, but contains no corresponding provision authorizing the National Assembly to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Applying the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one thing excludes others—the majority concluded that Parliament could not create an additional direct route of appeal to the Supreme Court through ordinary legislation.

The consequence was significant. The Court held that section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act, to the extent that it purports to permit a direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court, is inconsistent with sections 233 and 240 of the Constitution. By virtue of section 1(3) of the Constitution, it is therefore void to that extent.

The Court consequently held that an appeal from the LPDC cannot bypass the Court of Appeal and proceed directly to the Supreme Court. The direct appeal before it was therefore incompetent and was struck out for want of jurisdiction.

But the Court did not stop there. It also revisited its earlier decision in Okike v LPDC, where the Supreme Court had recognized its jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the LPDC. The majority reasoned that the constitutional implications of sections 233 and 240 had not received the detailed and holistic consideration they deserved in Okike. It therefore held that Okike could no longer stand to the extent that it recognized a direct LPDC-to-Supreme Court appeal and expressly overruled it on that point.

The decision consequently represents both a constitutional pronouncement on the limits of legislative power and a significant development in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on its own appellate jurisdiction.

7. When Can the Supreme Court Depart from Its Own Precedent?

One of the most significant aspects of Ben Mene-Ejegi is the Supreme Court’s decision to depart from its earlier decision in Okike v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee. The doctrine of stare decisis requires courts, particularly lower courts, to follow established judicial precedents. It promotes certainty, consistency and predictability in the administration of justice. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that it does not lightly depart from its previous decisions.

However, the doctrine is not absolute. The majority relied on Bucknor-Maclean v Inlaks Ltd and the principles restated in Akintokun v LPDC to recognise that there may be circumstances in which departure from precedent is necessary for justice and the proper development of the law. The Court further held that its power to depart from its previous decisions is inherent in its position as the final judicial authority in Nigeria and does not depend on an invitation from counsel.

Applying those principles, the majority considered Okike to have been decided without a sufficiently detailed examination of the constitutional relationship between sections 233 and 240 of the Constitution. In the majority’s view, had those provisions been examined together, the conclusion in Okike might have been different. The Court therefore overruled Okike to the extent that it recognized a direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court.

The decision was not unanimous, however. Justices Ogbuinya and Abiru dissented. They considered Okike to remain valid and binding, arguing that the subsequent decisions in Aladejobi and Akintokun dealt with a different statutory question and did not overrule Okike. In their view, the conditions necessary for departing from a previous decision had not been established.

The disagreement therefore goes beyond the question of LPDC appeals. It raises a broader question about the balance between respect for precedent and the Supreme Court’s responsibility to correct what it considers to be an erroneous interpretation of the law.

8. The Dissent: Another View of Jurisdiction and Precedent

The decision was not unanimous. Justices Obande Festus Ogbuinya and Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru dissented from the majority’s conclusion. Their position provides an important alternative perspective on both the constitutional question and the treatment of precedent.

The dissenting Justices did not accept the majority’s conclusion that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the LPDC. Their reasoning also challenged the majority’s treatment of Okike. In their view, the earlier decision remained relevant to the question before the Court, and the circumstances relied upon by the majority did not justify departing from established precedent.

This disagreement is particularly significant because it demonstrates that the constitutional question was not approached from a single judicial perspective. While the majority focused on the constitutional structure governing appellate jurisdiction and the limits of legislative power, the dissent placed greater emphasis on the existing jurisprudence and the doctrine of stare decisis.

The division within the Court therefore presents two competing judicial approaches: one centered on the constitutional limits of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and the correction of earlier jurisprudence, and another concerned with the stability of precedent and the continued force of Okike.

The dissent consequently adds an important dimension to Mene-Ejegi. It shows that the judgment is not merely about the destination of an LPDC appeal; it is also about how a final court should reconcile constitutional interpretation with the need for consistency in judicial precedent.

9. Significance of the Decision to Legal Practitioners?

The significance of Ben Mene-Ejegi extends beyond the parties to the case. The judgment directly affects the way disciplinary decisions of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee may be challenged.

The immediate consequence is that a legal practitioner cannot rely on section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act to bring a direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court. The majority held that the provision is constitutionally invalid to that extent.

This creates an important procedural question. If the Constitution does not permit a direct LPDC-to-Supreme Court appeal, but the existing statutory framework does not provide a constitutionally valid alternative appellate route, what avenue remains available to a practitioner dissatisfied with an LPDC decision? Recent commentary on the judgment has highlighted precisely this difficulty, noting the absence of a clear statutory right of appeal following the decision.

The issue therefore goes beyond jurisdiction. It touches on the relationship between professional discipline, access to appellate review and constitutional procedure. While the Supreme Court has clarified the constitutional limit on direct appeals to itself, the judgment also exposes the need to examine whether the existing legislative framework adequately provides for review of LPDC decisions.

For legal practitioners, the case consequently represents both a clarification of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisdiction and a development that raises further questions about the future structure of appeals from professional disciplinary decisions.

10. Conclusion

Ben Mene-Ejegi v LPDC reaffirms the principle of constitutional supremacy. The Supreme Court, by a five–two majority, held that section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act could not validly confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, departing from Okike v LPDC to that extent.

While the dissent highlights the importance of precedent and consistency, the decision ultimately emphasizes that legislation must conform to the Constitution. Its wider significance lies in defining the boundary between legislative power and constitutional jurisdiction in Nigeria.

For now, the Supreme Court has drawn that line in favor of constitutional supremacy. The remaining challenge is for the legal system to ensure that the consequences of that constitutional position are matched by a clear and effective framework for reviewing disciplinary decisions affecting legal practitioners.

References

Cases

1. Ben Mene-Ejegi Esq v Nigerian Bar Association & Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee SC/481/2018 (Supreme Court, 26 June 2026).
2. Charles Okike v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (2005) 3–4 SC 49.
3. Rotimi Williams Akintokun v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt 1423) 1.
4. Nwalutu v Nigerian Bar Association (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt 1673) 174.
5. Osuji v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (2025) 17 NWLR (Pt 2014) 317.
6. Bucknor-Maclean v Inlaks Ltd — relied upon by the Supreme Court in discussing the circumstances in which the Court may depart from its previous decisions.

Legislation

7. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), ss 1(3), 233 and 240.
8. Legal Practitioners Act, Cap L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, s 12(7).
9. Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No 21 of 1994.
10. Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 2007, s 2.

Secondary Sources

11. The Nigerian Lawyer, ‘Direct Appeals From LPDC Cannot Lie To Supreme Court’ (16 September 2026).
12. BarristerNG, ‘Supreme Court Strikes Out Direct LPDC Appeal, Declares Section 12(7) Void’ (15 September 2026).
13. Eyimofe Atake, SAN, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgment in Mene-Ejegi v NBA: One Act, Two Versions, And Now No Appeal’ Law & Society Magazine (31 July 2026).
14. Sani Ammani, ‘The Pond: The Story of Ben Mene-Ejegi v NBA’ The Legal Observer (5 August 2026).

Oluwaleye Adedoyin Grace, LLB. (Hons.)

Oluwaleyeadedoyingrace2001@gmail.com  or 08106289069