Forgotten Dairies
Britain’s £15 Million PPE Scandal: The Government Trapped Itself -By Fransiscus Nanga Roka
What does this pattern fit, and hence can be considered as legitimate? “VIP lane” scandals, opaque contracts and billions in PPE, later scrapped as unusable have already stained Britain’s pandemic procurement system. This case brings to light a much more disturbing data point: the government, in fact its own internal misconduct, may have been a reason that deal collapsed in the first place, even when it sued to get money back.What does this pattern fit, and hence can be considered as legitimate? “VIP lane” scandals, opaque contracts and billions in PPE, later scrapped as unusable have already stained Britain’s pandemic procurement system. This case brings to light a much more disturbing data point: the government, in fact its own internal misconduct, may have been a reason that deal collapsed in the first place, even when it sued to get money back.
Earlier in the week, London’s High Court taught Whitehall a life lesson in the art of humility in UK Global Healthcare Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2026] EWHC 561 (TCC), a judge denied the request by the Department of Health and Social Care to recover £15.35 million in advance payments made to a supplier who had provided no medical gloves during the darkest weeks of the pandemic (Fenwick Elliott). The government wanted a quick and unbloodied victory on summary judgment. In fact, Mr Justice Constable told it to go to a full trial on the grounds that the billion is 320 million gloves no shows may also be because of the ministry’s own behaviour. This should put Britain to shame far more than it has.
Remove the legal Latin and we have only a story we’ve all heard before: a government in crisis mode, awarding multimillion pound contracts and transferring public money within weeks of May and June 2020 before any one glove had been inspected, tested or shipped. When the agreement collapsed, DHSC’s argument was simple enough: the deadline passed and the goods were not available by then, we want our money back. That was what made them clean, ethical and beyond reproach, except the court didn’t believe it.
This is when the case becomes truly damning to the state and the company’s case turns into a counter-story from UKGH. The company says it was ready and willing to provide the gloves, but that DHSC prevented delivery by enforcing testing procedures not outlined in the contract and by turning away shipments on different grounds outside the contract, all while informally suggesting that deadlines could be extended. This was enough to sustain summary dismissal on the basis of the prevention principle: a party cannot claim damages for breach in the same way that it also contributed to its own failure. The judge also observed that there was a good chance that DHSC waived its own tight deadlines in the middle of negotiating, only to weaponise them later when it needed a legal way out.
If that version of events holds up in court this isn’t a tale of a rogue supplier ripping off the state. This is a tale of how the health ministry ad libbed testing standards when contracts were signed, shifted goalposts in mid-construction and now seeks to have courts sanitise its own mess into a nice breach-of-contract claim. And all agreed that the pandemic was chaos. But chaos is not a defence, nor £15.35 million of public funds a rounding error to be brushed aside by citing “exceptional circumstances.”
What does this pattern fit, and hence can be considered as legitimate? “VIP lane” scandals, opaque contracts and billions in PPE, later scrapped as unusable have already stained Britain’s pandemic procurement system. This case brings to light a much more disturbing data point: the government, in fact its own internal misconduct, may have been a reason that deal collapsed in the first place, even when it sued to get money back.
Kudos to the Court for not taking an easy path. Full trial is full scrutiny of DHSC’s testing regime, based on its correspondence, promises. That scrutiny for Whitehall is not to be feared, it should have asked it of itself in 2020. Instead, taxpayers foot the bill for a legal fight over money that may never have had to be forfeited at all, if only it had run its own emergency procurement with the relevant level of detail with respect to compliance details now being demanded by law.
It turns out accountability comes in both directions, and Britain’s government is only just beginning to see its hand in the events.
Fransiscus Nanga Roka
Faculty of Law University 17 August 1945 Surabaya and Managing Partener Law Firm Victorious Indonesia