Constitutionalising State Police in Nigeria: Distinguishing Real Challenges from Imagined Fears and Designing a Framework for Multi-Level Policing -By Dr. Ishie-Johnson Emmanuel

ABSTRACT

The exclusive vesting of policing powers in the Federal Government under section 214 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 has become increasingly untenable in the face of escalating insecurity. The clamour for State Police has therefore dominated constitutional reform discourse. This article interrogates the debate by distinguishing between _real_ structural challenges and _imagined_ or exaggerated fears. It argues that while risks of executive abuse, fiscal inequality, and operational fragmentation are substantive and demand legislative safeguards, the apocalyptic predictions of national disintegration lack empirical or comparative support. Drawing on the Amotekun jurisprudence and comparative federal practice, the article proposes a constitutional and statutory framework for multi-level policing grounded in federal minimum standards, fiscal guarantees, and independent oversight as the most viable path to effective security governance in Nigeria.

Keywords: State Police, Federalism, Constitution, Insecurity, Nigeria Police Force, Amotekun

1. Introduction

Security is the first duty of government under section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999¹. Yet Nigeria’s security architecture remains centrally monolithic. The Nigeria Police Force, with an estimated strength of 371,000 officers for a population exceeding 230 million, operates at a ratio of approximately 1 officer to 620 citizens². This falls significantly short of the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:400³.

The consequence has been predictable: delayed response, poor community intelligence, and the rise of non-state actors such as vigilantes, Civilian Joint Task Forces, and regional security outfits like Amotekun and Ebube Agu. The inability of the Federal Police to police Nigeria’s 923,768 sq km effectively has made the case for decentralization compelling.

However, the proposal for State Police is contentious. It is framed by proponents as a federalism imperative and by opponents as a recipe for gubernatorial dictatorship. This article seeks to bring analytical clarity by categorizing the objections into two: (i) _Real Challenges_, which are empirically verifiable and require institutional design; and (ii) _Imagined Challenges_, which are rhetorical and not supported by comparative or constitutional experience.

2. The Constitutional and Comparative Framework

2.1 The Nigerian Position

Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides: “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section, no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.”⁴ Section 215 further centralizes command in the Inspector-General of Police, with governors relegated to the status of “Chief Security Officers” without operational control⁵.

This unitary policing model is an anomaly in a federation. The Constitution itself recognizes federalism in sections 4 and 7, yet policing was deliberately centralized after the experience of Native Authority Police and Regional Police in the First Republic, which were allegedly abused for political ends⁶.

2.2 Comparative Federal Practice

Federal systems commonly decentralize policing. The United States has over 18,000 state, county, and municipal police agencies operating alongside federal agencies like the FBI⁷. Germany’s _Länderpolizei_ are constitutionally empowered under Article 30 of the Basic Law⁸. India’s Constitution places ‘Police’ under Entry 2 of the State List, giving states primary responsibility⁹.

The Nigerian model therefore stands out. The question is whether Nigeria’s political context makes decentralization impossible, or whether the law can be designed to mitigate risk.

3. The Real Challenges to State Police Creation

3.1 Politicization and the Risk of Executive Abuse

The most credible objection is the potential for abuse by state executives. Nigeria’s subnational politics is characterized by weak intra-party democracy, godfatherism, and high incumbency advantage. There is a real fear that State Police may be deployed to harass opposition figures, disrupt elections, or intimidate the judiciary and media¹⁰.

This fear is not speculative. The experience with State Independent Electoral Commissions and Task Forces shows how state institutions can be captured¹¹. If a governor controls recruitment, posting, and discipline of police, the force may become a partisan tool.

_Legal Mitigation_: This risk can be managed through (i) a State Police Service Commission with constitutional independence, modeled after the Federal Judicial Service Commission; (ii) fixed tenure for Commissioners of Police with removal only by a two-thirds resolution of the State House of Assembly; and (iii) concurrent oversight by the National Human Rights Commission and the courts.

3.2 Fiscal Inequality and Capacity Deficit

Policing is capital intensive. It requires salaries, training academies, forensic labs, fuel, and ICT infrastructure. As at 2024, 28 states generated less than 30% of their revenue internally, relying heavily on FAAC¹². A state that cannot pay teachers regularly cannot be expected to fund a professional police force.

This creates the risk of “security apartheid” — where Lagos, Rivers, and Kano maintain modern, well-equipped forces, while poorer states maintain underpaid, ill-equipped constabularies. Poorly paid police are more susceptible to extortion and corruption.

_Legal Mitigation_: A constitutional first-line charge of, say, 0.5% of all FAAC allocations to a State Policing Fund, administered by the State PSC, can guarantee a baseline. Federal grants-in-aid can also equalize capacity, as is done in India and Germany.

3.3 Operational Fragmentation and Trans-Border Crime

Criminality in Nigeria is increasingly mobile. Bandits operate across Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, and Kebbi. Kidnappers move victims across state lines within hours. A balkanized policing system without strong inter-state protocols may create jurisdictional gaps.

_Legal Mitigation_: The Constitution should retain the Nigeria Police Force for ‘federal crimes’ — terrorism, treason, cybercrime, and interstate highways. A National Police Standards Board can mandate inter-state intelligence sharing, hot pursuit agreements, and joint task forces, similar to the U.S. Interstate Compact system.

3.4 Recruitment, Ethnicity, and Human Rights Compliance

If recruitment is restricted to ‘indigenes’, State Police may entrench ethnic majoritarianism and alienate settlers and minorities. This could exacerbate herder-farmer and communal conflicts. Furthermore, the #EndSARS protests revealed the dangers of poor vetting, training, and accountability¹³.

_Legal Mitigation_: A federal character principle in recruitment, mandatory human rights training, and an independent complaints mechanism are non-negotiable. All State Police must be bound by the Police Act, 2020 and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015.

4. The Imagined or Overblown Challenges

4.1 “State Police Will Break Up Nigeria”

This is the most frequently cited fear. The argument is that arming states will embolden secessionist tendencies. However, there is no comparative evidence to support this. Germany, India, the U.S., Canada, and Australia all have state police and remain intact federations¹⁴.

Secession is a function of political legitimacy, not policing structure. Centralized policing did not prevent the civil war of 1967-1970. To suggest that decentralization will cause disintegration is to mistake correlation for causation.

4.2 “All Governors Will Become Tyrants”

This argument assumes uniform malfeasance across 36 states. It is both cynical and empirically weak. Many governors operate within legal constraints. Lagos State’s Neighborhood Safety Corps, established under the Lagos State Neighborhood Safety Corps Law, 2016, operates without turning Lagos into a police state¹⁵.

The proper response to abuse is institutional design, not paralysis. We do not abolish the executive because some governors are corrupt; we design checks. The same logic must apply to State Police.

4.3 “Federal Police is Neutral”

The notion that centralization guarantees neutrality is contradicted by Nigeria’s electoral history. The Federal Police has been accused of partisanship in elections, unlawful detentions, and extrajudicial killings¹⁶. Abuse is a function of weak accountability, not the tier of government. A well-regulated State Police can be more accountable to local communities than a distant federal command.

5. Toward a Constitutional Model for Multi-Level Policing in Nigeria*

[With Amotekun Jurisprudence]

The debate on State Police is no longer purely academic. The emergence of regional security outfits, particularly the South-West Security Network Agency codenamed “Amotekun”, has forced the courts and the polity to confront the constitutional question. The experience of Amotekun provides both a precedent and a cautionary tale for legislative design.

5.1 The Amotekun Precedent: _Attorney-General, Ekiti State v Attorney-General of the Federation_ Unreported, FHC/AD/CS/9/2020

In January 2020, the six South-West governors enacted parallel laws to establish the Amotekun Corps to complement federal policing in addressing kidnapping and herdsmen-farmer clashes¹⁷. The Federal Government, through the Attorney-General of the Federation, challenged the legality of the outfit.

The suit at the Federal High Court, Ado-Ekiti, sought a declaration that the establishment of Amotekun was unconstitutional and inconsistent with sections 214, 215 and 4(5) of the 1999 Constitution¹⁸.

Key Arguments of the Federal Government:

1. Section 214(1) CFRN creates a monopoly for the Nigeria Police Force and prohibits “any other police force”.
2. Public Order, including policing, is on the Exclusive Legislative List, Item 45, Part I, Second Schedule¹⁹.
3. Only the National Assembly can legislate on policing.

Key Arguments of the South-West States:

1. Amotekun was not a “Police Force” but a “security outfit” to assist the Police under community policing²⁰.
2. Under section 4(7) CFRN, State Houses of Assembly can make laws for the peace, order and good government of the state.
3. Section 14(2)(b) imposes a duty on all tiers of government to secure lives and property, and states cannot be disabled from fulfilling that duty.

Outcome and Significance:

The suit was withdrawn after a meeting between the Federal Government, the Governors’ Forum and the Vice President in February 2020²¹. The Federal Government conceded that Amotekun would operate with federal approval, under the supervision of the Nigeria Police Force, and its members would not carry AK-47 rifles²².

_Legal Analysis_: Although there was no judicial pronouncement, the episode is instructive. It shows three things:

1. Political Necessity: The Federal Government could not sustain the argument that states should do nothing in the face of insecurity.
2. Legal Vacuum: The lack of a constitutional framework forced a political settlement, leaving Amotekun in a grey area. Its powers, funding, and accountability remain unclear.
3. Need for Clarity: The “not police, but security outfit” distinction is untenable in the long run. If an agency arrests, detains, and prosecutes, it is performing police functions and must be regulated as such.

The Amotekun experience proves that regional policing will emerge by necessity if the Constitution does not provide for it by law. The better approach is to constitutionalize it with safeguards, rather than allow proliferation by executive fiat.

5.2 Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Drawing from Amotekun and comparative law, section 214 should be amended to read:

> “( _1) There shall be a Nigeria Police Force.

> (2) Subject to this section and to any Act of the National Assembly, a State may establish and maintain a State Police Force for that State.

> (3) The National Assembly shall make an Act prescribing minimum standards, training, vetting, and oversight for all State Police Forces.”_

This moves policing to the Concurrent Legislative List, as recommended by the 2014 National Conference²³. Federal law will set the floor; states can build above it.

5.3 Institutional Safeguards to Prevent Amotekun’s Ambiguity

The Amotekun laws lacked uniformity and independent oversight²⁴. To avoid this, the following must be entrenched:

1. State Police Service Commission: Constitutionally entrenched, not statutory. Modeled after section 197 CFRN on the State Judicial Service Commission. It will handle recruitment, discipline, and promotion, insulating officers from gubernatorial fiat.
2. National Police Standards Board: A federal body to accredit State Police academies, set vetting standards, and conduct annual audits. No state force can operate without NPSB certification.
3. Fixed Tenure and Removal Process: Commissioners of State Police should serve a fixed 4-year term, removable only by a two-thirds resolution of the State House of Assembly on grounds of misconduct or incapacity. This mirrors the security of tenure for judges under section 292 CFRN.
4. Arms and Equipment: The NPSB, in consultation with the National Security Adviser, should approve the class of arms for each state, based on threat assessment. This addresses the AGF’s concern about AK-47 proliferation.

5.4 Fiscal Architecture: Avoiding the Amotekun Funding Problem

Amotekun has been hampered by inconsistent funding. Some states fund it well, others do not²⁵. Policing cannot be treated as a discretionary budget item.

A constitutional first-line charge of not less than 0.5% of monthly FAAC to a _State Policing Fund_ will guarantee a baseline. The fund should be paid directly to the SPSC, not through the governor’s office, to prevent diversion. This is analogous to the funding of UBEC under section 2 of the UBEC Act, 2004.

5.5 Functional Demarcation of Powers

The Amotekun controversy arose because its mandate overlapped with the Police²⁶. A clear constitutional division is required:

Tier       Mandate              Example Offences

Federal Police              National security, inter-state crime    Terrorism, treason, cybercrime, trafficking, federal highways

State Police       Intra-state public safety and order   Armed robbery, burglary, cultism, domestic violence, traffic

Community/Vigilante              Intelligence and prevention only              Under strict supervision of State Police. No arrest powers beyond citizen’s arrest.

This structure preserves federal supremacy on national threats while giving states power over local crime, which constitutes over 80% of police workload.

6. Conclusion

The Amotekun episode is Nigeria’s closest experiment with State Police. It revealed both the urgency for decentralization and the dangers of proceeding without a constitutional framework. The withdrawal of the suit was a political truce, not a legal resolution.

Nigeria cannot continue to centralize failure. The security challenges of 2026 — kidnapping, banditry, cultism, and communal violence — are hyper-local and require hyper-local responses. The Nigeria Police Force is overstretched and structurally ill-suited for community policing.

The challenges to State Police are real, but they are design challenges. Politicization, funding, training, and coordination can be legislated against. The imagined fears of disintegration and universal tyranny are not supported by comparative federal practice.

Section 14(2)(b) CFRN makes security the primary purpose of government. The law must now give states the tools to fulfill that purpose, without compromising the unity of the Federation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [CFRN 1999].
2. Nigeria Police Force, _Annual Report_ 2024; National Population Commission, _Population Projection_ 2024.
3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, _Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity_ 2011, p. 12.
4. CFRN 1999 s 214(1).
5. CFRN 1999 s 215.
6. E.O. Awa, _Federal Government in Nigeria_ [University of California Press 1964] 112.
7. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, _Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies_ 2020.
8. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 30.
9. Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 2.
10. R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’ (2010) 42 _Arizona State Law Journal_ 663.
11. C. Nwankwo, ‘Electoral Administration in Nigeria’ (2018) 12 _Journal of African Elections_ 45.
12. National Bureau of Statistics, _Internally Generated Revenue at State Level Q4 2024_.
13. Judicial Panel of Inquiry on #EndSARS, _Lagos State Report_ 2021, Vol. 2.
14. D.J. Elazar, _Exploring Federalism_ [University of Alabama Press 1987] 201.
15. Lagos State Neighborhood Safety Corps Law No. 4 of 2016, s 3.
16. Amnesty International, _Time to End Impunity: Torture and Other Human Rights Violations by the Nigeria Police Force_ 2020.
17. Ekiti State Security Network Agency and Amotekun Corps Law, 2020, s 2.
18. _Attorney-General, Ekiti State v Attorney-General of the Federation_ FHC/AD/CS/9/2020, Statement of Claim, paras 3.1-3.4.
19. CFRN 1999, Second Schedule, Part I, Item 45.
20. _Ibid_, Joint Affidavit in Support, para 7.
21. Premium Times, ‘FG, South-West Governors Reach Agreement on Amotekun’ 23 February 2020.
22. _Ibid_.
23. Report of the 2014 National Conference, Vol. I, p. 284.
24. See comparative provisions in Oyo, Ondo, and Lagos Amotekun Laws, 2020.
25. International Crisis Group, ‘Containing Nigeria’s Spiralling Insecurity’ _Africa Report_ No. 303, 2021, p. 19.
26. _Attorney-General, Ekiti State v AGF_, para 3.2.