Understanding the third Russia-Africa Summit -By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

By declaring October 28-29, the dates for the third Russia-Africa Summit, which carries a strategic weight, Russia has demonstrated another practical approach towards raising multifaceted relations with Africa, reconvening African leaders, corporate executive entrepreneurs, stake holders and academic researchers to highlight its noticeable achievements and bilateral agreements that have been implemented since 2019. Russia has already held two significant Summits – the first one in its southern coastal city Sochi, and in St. Petersburg, the second largest city.

With an explicit purpose and sharpened position to its partnerships with Africa, the forthcoming October deliberations have to evolve an indepth analysis of its economic diplomacy, and what have so far been delivered from the multitude of pledges and bilateral agreements signed during the previous Summits.

Russia’s media gave a tectonic coverage following concrete dates of the Summit announcement, referencing Anatoly Bashkin, Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa at the Foreign Ministry, who noted that a number of African leaders have already confirmed their participation in the Kremlin-supported corporate event. In late March, President Vladimir Putin finally approved Moscow as the venue and ordered the creation of an organising committee for the Summit under the leadership of presidential aide Yury Ushakov.

Putin indicated with newly arrived African ambassadors, in the Kremlin, that Russia and Africa have “relations of true partnership, support and mutual assistance” and added “We remain committed to the expansion of mutual political, economic, and humanitarian contacts. We continue assisting the people of Africa in their ambition to develop, to actively participate in international affairs.”

Duplicating Tasks, Little Results
Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is a Dept.of Sub-Saharan Africa with a well-staffed directors with a clearly-defined strategic tasks including Pan-African affairs. The first Summit held in October 2019, ultimately seeks to inject a new dynamism in the existing Russia-Africa relations, and it now has the newly created Public Council under the Secretariat of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum. The Secretariat further created a Public Council, the body also incorporates a Coordinating Council, Research Council and Media Council. This structure aims, primarily, to uplift and solidly support the entire gamut of relations into a new stage, change perception among the Russian and African public and give Russian-African relations an entirely new outlook into the future.

Sergey Lavrov has also created Joint Intergovernmental Commissions on Economic and Trade, and Russia has this Commission established with 28 African countries. The Joint Commissions meet regularly to strengthen economic and trade collaborations. Lavrov has also established special trade sections, headed by highly qualified staff, in Russia’s diplomatic missions inside Africa.

According to historical documents, the Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with African States (AfroCom) was created on the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation and Vnesheconombank with the support of the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. It has had support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Trade, and the Ministry of Natural Resources, as well as the Ministry of Higher Education and Science. Long before the first Summit, as far back in 2009 as the year of its creation, AfroCom is designed to be “an ubuntu-focused platform to connect and empower the global Afro-community – across Africa and the diaspora.” It is currently headed by ex-Senator Igor Morozov, who took over from Petr Fradkov now head of SobkomBank.

There is also another business NGO referred to as Association for  Coordinating Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS), headed by Russia’s former Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov. This Russian NGO, with Supervisory Board and Expert Council, is also another key structure for the development of economic ties between Russia and Africa. The list of this kind of organisations, enjoying state grants, are endless in the Federation Federation. Indeed, Russia now has all the structures fixed and two Summit’s declarations that set out the focused directions for the necessary take-off to Africa. “There is a lot of interesting and demanding work ahead, and perhaps, there is a need to pay attention to the experience of China, which provides its enterprises with state guarantees and subsidies, thus ensuring the ability of companies to work on a systematic and long-term basis,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly said.

According to Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Ministry would continue to provide all-round support for initiatives aimed at strengthening relations between Russia and Africa. “Our African friends have spoken up for closer interaction with Russia and would welcome our companies in their markets. But much depends on the reciprocity of Russian businesses and their readiness to show initiative and ingenuity, as well as to offer quality goods and services,” he stressed.

Amid these years of European and Western sanctions, Moscow is looking for both allies and an opportunity to boost trade and investment in Africa. Currently, Russia’s trade with Africa is less than half that of France with the continent and 10 times less than that of China. Asian countries are doing brisk business with Africa. In terms of arms sales, Russia leads the pack in Africa, and Moscow still has a long way to catch up with many other foreign players there. In 2024, Russia’s trade with African countries grew more than 17 percent and exceeded $25billion. At the Sochi summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he would like to bring the aggregate trade figure, over the next few years at least, to $40billion.

Russia’s Economic Weaknesses
Research shows that Russia’s economic footprints in Africa remains comparatively weak largely due to lack of financing mechanisms, and a reliance on short-term- security-based diplomacy. While Russia boasts strong diplomatic and military ties, it seriously lacks the institutional funding and capital capabilities of competitors like China or the European Union.

Lack of Institutional Financing
Unlike China’s robust use of it policy bank, ExIm Bank, or Western development agencies like the U.S. DFC, Russia lacks the institutional mechanisms to provide African governments with major credit lines, concessionary loans, or capital guarantees for infrastructure. This frequently leaves bilateral memorandums, agreements, and investment deals stuck in the planning phases.

Western Sanctions
Since the 2022 ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, Russia’s major banks have been severely impacted by global financial sanctions. This limits international credit and makes it remarkably difficult for Russian private firms to finance, sustain, and export large-scale industrial or development projects.

Asymmetrical Trade Dynamics
Outside of grain exports, nuclear energy technology, and some defense contracting, Russia and Africa share very little in complementary trade. Logistical hurdles, rising transport costs, and an over-reliance on a handful of commodities prevent Russia from competing effectively across broader commercial or consumer sectors.

Focus on Security over Economics
Records show Russia barters military support security training, and weapons in exchange for direct access to natural resources with African countries, particularly  the Francophone, facing financial difficulties or instability which they often blamed on France. It is no secret that Russia’s heavy reliance on exporting military equipment and weaponry to conflicting African regions. This has been very controversial, attracting arguments whether Russia was concretely interested in development and providing infrastructure questions in the continent. Russia has never provided any development to African countries it has military agreements. This leaves persistent gaps between its ambitions to sipp-off resources in exchange (barter system) of military-equipment supply and intention of keeping peace, most of it at the expanse of on-the-ground economic development.

South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) said in its report that strengthening military-technical cooperation is part of the foreign policy to generate revenue. It has agreements with more than 20 African countries. In this report, SAIIA argues logically that few expect Russia’s security engagement to bring peace and development to countries with which it has security partnerships. The narratives pointed out clearly that Moscow’s strategic incapability, inconsistency and dominating opaque relations are adversely affecting sustainable developments in those African countries. Peace-building and conflict resolution are so remote from providing  infrastructures and spurring economic growth. In 2023, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute also said Russia accounted approximately $14bn of arms supplied to the Saharan Africa.

Rethinking Development Paradigms
With the third Russia-Africa Summit, African leaders have to seriously think along the following lines, determining how to finance projects, instead of waiting over implementing agreements and to be re-signed in future, and finally keep postponing economic developments. In practical reality, African leaders have to choose between symbolism and concrete alternatives to attaining their development sovereignty.

From the previous Summits, Russia has road-mapped priorities with Africa in the following spheres: Energy and nuclear technologies, Economic and Trade, Oil and Gas Exploration, Transport and Logistics, Financial Mechanisms, Industry and Manufacturing, Agriculture and Food Security, Military and Maintaining Security, Healthcare Systems, Digital Transformation, Humanitarian, Science and Innovation, Education and Training,

For Africa, practical collaborations have to move beyond geopolitical symbolism, shift away from the stage of rhetoric to a different stage of interests in implementing agreements to measure results of partnerships and development growth. Collaboration has to move to a broader level of identifying economic opportunity and to be followed by an investment posture, a show of valuable engagement over mere rhetoric. It is practically time to act, show noticeable outcomes of declarations from first and second Summits. In a geopolitical context, Africa now has suitable external alternatives.

At the Institute for African Studies, researchers on Russian-African cooperation, indicated that Russia has influenced Africa in multiple ways, but time has indeed changed. Across Africa, a broader global dynamics is centered on the rivalry between United States and China, including over-access to critical resources and technology chains. China’s global dominance in the extraction and processing of rare metals used by Beijing as a competitive advantage, including through control over African mining enterprises and logistics infrastructure. In turn, the United States is increasingly tying its position on the continent to countering China, in critical raw materials supply chains, digital infrastructure, and technological standards. As a result, Africa has become an important arena for their technological and economic clashes. In all these, Russia doesn’t have the same interest in African resources. Russia absolutely does not need Africa, it is resource-rich and wealthy itself. Africa has to ensure its own economic sovereignty. In this concluding context, Russia and Africa are poles apart. It is important to note that Russia’s interest is only to support Africa to gain an economic power in the emerging multipolar world.