ECOWAS At 50: Brotherhood On The Brink Or A Union Poised For Reinvention? -By Isaac Asabor

As the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) commemorates its 50th anniversary in 2025, the moment calls for both celebration and sober reflection. Founded on May 28, 1975, with the lofty vision of regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective security, ECOWAS was conceived as a panacea to the socio-political and economic woes of West Africa. Half a century later, the regional bloc finds itself navigating one of the most turbulent chapters in its history.

The recent exit of three key member states, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, on January 29, 2025, has cast a long shadow over the golden jubilee celebrations. Their withdrawal, following prolonged tensions between the ECOWAS leadership and these military-led governments, underscores the fragility of the union and raises uncomfortable questions about its relevance, resilience, and roadmap for the future.

To understand the gravity of the current crisis, one must examine the journey so far. Over five decades, ECOWAS has made commendable strides. It has established a free trade area and a common market, created institutions like the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Parliament, and played pivotal roles in peacekeeping missions across the sub-region, including in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia.

The protocol on free movement of persons, goods, and services remains one of ECOWAS’s most celebrated achievements. It has empowered millions of West Africans to live and work across borders, enriching the socio-cultural and economic tapestry of the region. The ECOWAS Passport is symbolic of a shared regional identity, an ambitious dream of African unity long before the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was even conceived.

However, these gains have often been undermined by internal contradictions. ECOWAS has struggled with inconsistency in enforcing democratic norms, a weak response to human rights violations, and a perceived overreach in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Accusations of elitism and disconnect from the grassroots have further dented its image.

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, now united under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is not just a protest. It is a political earthquake. These countries, each governed by military juntas, cited a lack of support, respect, and solidarity from ECOWAS. They argued that rather than being assisted during their moment of transition, they were sanctioned and isolated, pushing them into an alternative regional alignment.

Critics of ECOWAS argue that its knee-jerk reaction to coups often lacks nuance. By swiftly imposing sanctions, the bloc inadvertently punishes already suffering populations and drives these states further into geopolitical alternatives like Russia and China, which offer strategic partnerships without lectures on democracy.

To many observers, the exit of these three states is not just about juntas versus democracy. It is about a deeper crisis of confidence in ECOWAS. A significant portion of the populations in these countries support their military regimes, not because they reject democracy, but because they see the previous civilian governments, often backed by ECOWAS, as corrupt, ineffective, and out of touch.

At this juncture, it is expedient to conjecture that the future of ECOWAS rest on three likely scenarios that cut across fragmentation and irrelevance, reform and reinvention coupled with coexistence and competition.

Explanatorily put, if the current trend of disunity persists, ECOWAS risks becoming a toothless bulldog, an institution with grand pronouncements but little influence. More member states could align with the Sahel bloc or choose to drift toward nationalistic isolation. Without trust and unity, the core idea of regional integration collapses.

In a similar vein, the current crisis could become a catalyst for radical introspection and reform. ECOWAS must re-examine its governance structures, sanction mechanisms, and methods of engagement. Instead of isolating errant members, a dialogue-based, inclusive approach should be prioritized. The bloc must also reform to reflect grassroots concerns, not just the interests of heads of state.

Also, a more realistic scenario may involve ECOWAS continuing to exist alongside alternative regional alliances like the AES. In such a configuration, competition may spur institutional reforms and efficiency. However, it could also lead to policy conflicts, trade barriers, and duplicated efforts, hardly ideal for a region already grappling with poverty, insecurity, and underdevelopment.

Given the backdrop of the foregoing likelihoods, it is germane to ask, “What must be done?” The answer cannot be farfetched as there is no denying the fact that for ECOWAS to survive and remain relevant beyond its golden jubilee, it must adopt a bold, new mindset.

In a similar vein, there is an urgent need to put the people first within the scheme of ECOWAS. This is as the real strength of ECOWAS lies not in presidential palaces or summit resolutions but in the people of West Africa. Therefore, policies must reflect their needs that cut across jobs, security, education, health, and dignity. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the language of sanctions must give way to solutions.

Also, there is the need for the embracement of multipolar engagement. In fact, ECOWAS must accept that the days of sole Western alignment are over. Its member states, especially in the Sahel, are exploring relations with China, Russia, Turkey, and others. ECOWAS should play a facilitative role, not a gatekeeping one.

In fact, after the Golden Jubilee, the leadership of ECOWAS should embark on strengthening institutions, rather than strengthening individuals. Too often, ECOWAS has been hijacked by a few dominant leaders. Again, its institutions, parliament, court, commission, must be strengthened to act independently, with transparency and accountability.

In fact, there is an urgent need for the tackling of insecurity as a regional challenge. Terrorism, banditry, and organized crime are no longer national problems. They crisscross borders and demand a coordinated regional response. The AES nations’ frustration partly stems from a perception that ECOWAS abandoned them in their darkest hours.

Without a doubt, fifty years is a milestone worthy of celebration, but ECOWAS cannot afford to be lost in nostalgia. The anniversary must be a moment of reckoning. It must ask the tough questions: Is ECOWAS still a “community” in the true sense of the word? Can it evolve beyond being a club of presidents into a union of people? Will it take the exit of three sovereign states as a wake-up call or dismiss it as political noise?

The future of ECOWAS depends on what it chooses to become in this critical moment. West Africa is at a crossroads. Unity is no longer guaranteed, but neither is disintegration. What remains certain is that a reinvented, inclusive, and responsive ECOWAS is not only possible, it is urgently necessary.