Europe’s Cartels Are Putting Democracy on Trial -By Fransiscus Nanga Roka

The battle against Europe’s growing cocaine problem has evolved into a competition for authority between public agencies and organized crime groups that have the resources to purchase influence and enforce compliance through intimidation.

The Netherlands’ Marengo trial shows us that there is a lot of power in our judicial system but there is also a high price tag. On February 27, 2024, the District Court of Amsterdam sentenced Ridouan Taghi, Saïd Razzouki and Mario R. to life in prison. The court determined that Taghi’s group was guilty of five murders, two attempted murders and had plans for more murders. All of the verdicts were about an organized murder group not one verdict that proved every claim made against the European cocaine market.

This distinction is important. Operation Desert Light targeted what can be referred to as a “super cartel,” which was a collection of criminal organizations that have been under investigation by various law enforcement agencies in multiple countries. On November 2022, Europol announced 49 arrests as a result of coordinated operations and raids in both Europe and the United Arab Emirates. When Europol estimated that this alliance was responsible for controlling nearly one-third of Europe’s cocaine trade, it was stating an investigative conclusion based on its findings, not a factual determination made by any court system.

The Marengo trial, along with other similar trials that have taken place in recent years regarding the prosecution of drug traffickers, demonstrate multiple threats. When these multiple threats are combined into a single exciting story, however, it makes it difficult to tell who has been found guilty, who is still being tried, and what parts of the organized crime structure will continue to exist.

In addition to drugs coming into Belgium from Antwerp and Rotterdam, when there are weaknesses in how businesses use technology that can be used by criminals to get into the business’ systems, then there will be problems in courts, areas where people live, and the trust that people have in their government. Senior judicial officials in Belgium stated in March 2026 that the problem with drug crimes was threatening the stability of the institutions.

The fear that is present because of the Marengo trial is an illustration of what is at stake. Attorney Derk Wiersum (lawyer) and journalist Peter R. de Vries (confidant), both brothers of Crown Witness Nabil B., were killed. The killings put a great deal of stress on the court process, however they were not included as charges against those involved in the Marengo trial. Accuracy adds to the argument for the weakness of the institutions that are supposed to protect us from criminals; exaggerations weaken this point.

The strategic implications are clear; merely jailing leadership will not alone eliminate the conditions that create profit and replacement for criminal organization.

Belgium, the Netherlands and their European partners should act on five fronts.

In the first place, establish permanent judicial protection. All individuals who are in danger witnesses, family members of those involved in cases, attorneys, journalists, and other court employees must receive a coordinated assessment of potential risks they face, timely protective measures, and access to safe environments. Protection should be initiated prior to the point at which a threat can be predicted based on evidence of past violence or threats.

Second, use accountable access control measures to restrict entry into the port system. Also, use independent investigations to determine if corruption has occurred. Finally, establish a reporting mechanism that provides workers with a safe way to report concerns about possible illegal activities at the port. Both government agencies and the terminal operators must conduct audits to verify who has access to sensitive data related to cargo, as well as investigate unexplained wealth. Workers being coerced to participate in illegal activity at the port must have a reliable means of reporting their experiences without fear of retaliation.

Third, prosecute financial facilitators as well as the traffickers themselves. To do so, investigators will need to link the ownership of assets (beneficial owners), real estate purchases and sales, and suspicious commercial transactions on an international basis. Recovered assets should be tied to evidence and judicial review, and the results of the asset recovery process should be reported publicly so that everyone knows exactly how much has been recovered.

Fourth, you should be fair to both parties in the use of unencrypted communications. Both defense and prosecution should have access to all materials that are relevant, provide verifiable evidence of where the communications came from (provenance) and give each side an opportunity to argue their position regarding how those communications should be interpreted. These factors will ensure that your conviction remains valid over time. Time does not replace evidence.

Lastly, combine international cooperation with local prevention. This includes having timely extradition proceedings, conducting joint investigations, providing youth employment opportunities, and supporting the exit of minors that have been recruited.

Successful results include fewer fearful witnesses, decreased levels of corruption, increased numbers of convictions, and safer environments. These are all better outcomes than simply larger photos of seized items.

Europe established ports as a way to facilitate trade. Now, it must develop institutions with sufficient strength to restrict criminals from using the rapid rate of commerce as a tool for coercion.

The duration of a life sentence for a criminal may terminate his liberty. Only continued organizational efforts will be able to stop a cartel from intimidating the public.

Fransiscus Nanga Roka

Faculty of Law University 17 August 1945 Surabaya and Managing Partner Law Firm Victorious Indonesia