Russia and Africa advancing Shared Priorities -By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In late October, participating African leaders, entrepreneurs and stake-holders, and experts will be looking for corporate bilateral economic deals, during the 3rd Russia-Africa summit, but such expected arrangements are blissfully complicated–and as potential Russian investors, both state and private, grossly lack appropriate financial mechanism. After text exchanges for a couple months, exploring obstacles impeding Russia-Africa economic cooperation and Russia’s inability to make practical investments across Africa, Professor Irina Abramova, director of the Institute for African Studies, neatly outlined the situation.

Lack of Systemic Consistency
In the interview text posted to Institute’s website, Abramova underscored the fact that “the development of Russian industry depends on how we interact. We are talking and repeating about developing technology, developing industry, and not becoming a raw materials appendage of the West.” But what Russia lacks, in practical terms, is coordination.

Lack of consistency. This systemic coordination and consistency are crucial in realizing Russia’s policy goals in Africa. Quite convincingly, Abramova described previous African leaders’ gathering in 2019 and 2023 as “summit-fest” and the Russia and African countries signed several bilateral agreements and posed for group photographs, but to what degree are Russia’s primary economic and investment interests in Africa? The first summit had 49 leaders, and the second summit 17 presidents. Referring to the past, Russia’s interest was at the peripheral border to Africa, while Russia was seemingly trying to integrate itself into the Western world. In December 2023, a new Russian foreign policy was however adopted, which included a detailed section dedicated to Africa.

Nevertheless, Africans still expect something tangible and different, especially relating to investment. “So, Russia’s trade stands at $27 billion, then with Europe almost $400 billion while China has $300 billion. We don’t finance, and with money Africans understand Russia can’t provide under the current circumstances,” Abramova argued. “We all know the term public-private-partnership, but it turns out that Russian businesses, accustomed to opening differently, are struggling to invest in Africa. They’re waiting for government loans, expecting state-controlled support for years,” according to Abramova.

Tracking the Past History
Perhaps, with geopolitical reasons on the background, Russia has begun reshaping its rhetoric with Africa. Noticeably, Africa aims at consolidating its independence, and economic sovereignty. Russia has its own historical foundation. Therefore, Russia urges Africa to pursue an independent foreign policy and overcome its colonial legacy. In recent decades after the sudden collapse of the Soviet era, Russia has been undergoing a major transformation. However, the political dialogue between Moscow and Africa’s capitals has been maintained, creating the foundation for re-shaping a new policy agenda. This has genuinely reflected on the current relations with the continent, and with regional blocs and the African Union.

It is the long-term policy approach that Russia considers to be the most sensible, while ensuring that expanding trade and business-to-business contacts may yield results in the very near future. This may, consequentially, have different timeframes. Africa is changing very rapidly. African countries are becoming important decision-making centres; their economic and political influence is growing; and African states themselves are actively shaping their own approaches to issues of international security, trade, development and the reform of the global financial system.

And of course, Russia welcomes this process. It unwaveringly believes that African states must be able to determine for themselves with whom and in which areas they wish to cooperate. That is precisely what is advocated for, a multipolar world and fairer representation of African countries in international institutions, first and foremost in the United Nations.

Strategic Agenda 2026
In this context, the forthcoming 3rd Russia–Africa summit, to be held on 28–29 October 2026 in Moscow, is of particular significance – the third summit of this calibre. The first took place in Sochi in 2019, and the second in St Petersburg in July 2023. Re-summarizing priority areas as follows:

The first is trade and investment. Russia is keen to ensure that trade with African countries grows not only through the supply of specific products, but also through joint ventures, industrial cooperation, localisation and investment.

The second is energy. In this area, Russia possesses expertise that may be particularly sought after by African states. This involves not only the construction of power stations, but also the training of specialists and the development of a scientific and regulatory framework.

The third is food and energy security. Africa needs stable supplies of food, fertilisers and energy resources, and Russia has significant capabilities in these areas.

The fourth is education, science and technology. Russia has traditionally regarded capacity-building as one of the most reliable ways to foster long-term partnership. If an African country receives not only equipment but also specialists capable of independently utilising and developing the relevant technologies, the benefits of such cooperation will endure for decades.

Fifth – security and the fight against terrorism. African states determine their own needs, whilst Russia stands ready to provide the necessary training, expertise and technology. This is particularly relevant to the fight against terrorism, transnational crime and other threats spreading across West Africa and the Sahel.

Finally, the international agenda will be of particular importance. Russia and African countries advocate strengthening the role of the UN, reforming international financial institutions, enhancing the role of developing countries in global decision-making, and opposing unilateral sanctions mechanisms that hinder the development of world trade.

What ‘Time to Act’ on Bilateral Agreements?
For this purpose, a new department – Department for Partnership with Africa – was created at the Foreign Ministry which has been assigned with expanded diplomatic capabilities, and to supervise prompt implementation of agreements. Within the Action Plan of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum for the period 2023-2026, it is anticipated that both Russia and Africa will hold constructive positions on bilateral ties, implement with vigour, several agreements that were signed during the first and second summits, particularly in the economic sectors across Africa. It is time, at least, to narrate achievements, challenges and the strategic headway forward this late October, the 3rd Russia-Africa Summit.

In the ultimate analysis, Russia seeks to develop not only contacts with individual African states, but also institutional dialogue with Regional Associations and the African Union. In July 2026, the African Union Commission and Russia reaffirmed the need to further strengthen cooperation, including the development of sectorial dialogues and expert consultations on priority areas of cooperation. The joint statement explicitly noted that the 3rd Russia-Africa Summit will definitely create the necessary conditions for a new impetus to multifaceted relations between Russia and Africa and to the future advancement of shared priorities.