Sowore: Sticks, Stones and the Test of Consistency -By Victor Sunday

Introduction

On October 19, 2026, Omoyele Sowore stood in the Federal High Court in Abuja and demanded that a lawyer take back a remark calling him a “tout”. The irony was hard to miss as the same Sowore is on trial in that same court for calling the President a “criminal” online and he says the law should never punish that kind of speech. According to reports, the exchange took place before the court sat. A lawyer, identified only as Yakubu, allegedly called Sowore a “tout”. Sowore demanded that he withdraw it, asked what he had done to deserve it, and later called the lawyer an “idiot” who should know better than to insult anyone in a courtroom. Critics have concluded that he could not take what he dished out.

In all honesty, that appears to be a fair jab but one must ask whether Sowore believes that the freedom to use insulting language should apply to everyone, including those who insult him.

The Limits of Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)

Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution gives every person the right to freedom of expression, which includes holding opinions and sharing ideas without interference. However, Section 45(1) of the 1999 CFRN sets the limit to the end that a law may restrict that right if it is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society for reasons such as public order, public safety or protecting the rights of others. In Sowore’s trial, the State is the one restricting speech so the State must show that section 24 of the Cybercrimes Act under which Sowore is charged passes this test.

The key point for consideration here is that section 39 of the 1999 Constitution works against the State. It is a shield against government power and not a rule of good manners between citizens. A citizen’s remark somewhere about someonw is the act of a private person and Sowore’s reply is simply his own freedom of expression at work and demanding a retraction is speech too. So, on the narrow question of whether Sowore broke the free speech principle by getting angry, the honest answer is no because being offended is not the same as censoring.

On Sowore’s Double Standard

The weakness of Sowore’s position lies in the reason behind the protection. In the case of Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso (2014), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that the State should interfere less with speech about public figures. People in visible public roles must accept more criticism than private citizens and jail terms for defamation are out of proportion. The African Charter is part of Nigerian law as seen in Abacha v Fawehinmi, and the ECOWAS Court has applied the same Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights guarantee to the statute Sowore is charged under. This is the backbone of Mr. Sowore’s defense.

However, the rule does not stop at the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Omoyele Sowore is a presidential candidate who has already run twice and has declared for the next election. He is a public figure too and the rule in Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso asks public figures to take sharper words not softer ones. When he says that the lawyer has “no right” to insult him, he is demanding protection from offensive words even though his own  argument suggests that the law does not give even the most powerful person in the country such protection. Now, that is the hypocrisy being pointed out. The issue is not whether he can be punished for feeling angry but whether he is applying the law consistently.

The two remarks in the scenarios are not the same kind of speech. Sowore’s words, on the prosecution’s own case, concerned how the President holds office, which is the kind of public-interest speech the law protects most strongly. “Tout”, aimed at a private litigant is personal abuse about the man and says nothing on any public issue. The law gives the first more room than the second. That weakens the claim that the two men did the same thing but it does not rescue Sowore from the tolerance rule in Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso because he is the one being insulted here and public figures are expected to respond constructively or absorb insults of this sort.

Conclusion

Therefore viewing the scenario via the lens of the law, Sowore did not contradict the freedom of expression he defends. Section 39 restrains the State and answering an insult with words is itself protected. He would be inconsistent only if he decided to use state institutions to harass or intimidate the individual concerned.

However, viewing it via the lens of principle, his position is less comfortable. The tolerance that Konaté case and the ECOWAS cases demand of public figures applies to a presidential candidate as much as to the President. Demanding that someone withdraw an insult while arguing that insulting a public figure is not a crime is inconsistent. The criticism is about hypocrisy not about any other trivial matter.

Indeed, uneasy lies the head that wears the crown let the uncrowned tread carefully.

Victor Sunday is a legal writer, researcher, orator and public affairs analyst. He can be contacted via victorsundayonwukwe@gmail.com