Reciprocal Trade or Reciprocal Risk? Assessing Indonesia’s Position on the Board of Peace -By Moch Rizky Adi Pratama Putra, Erny Herlin Setyorini

Indonesia’s decision to join the Board of Peace (BoP) and sign the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States marks a new chapter in the nation’s geopolitical and economic dynamics. This step did not occur in a vacuum; the BoP was born out of the initiative of United States President Donald Trump, who encouraged a new cooperative architecture based on strategic interests and reciprocal trade. The ART itself is framed on the principle of reciprocity, a concept that promises mutually beneficial trade relations. In the practice of international relations, reciprocity is often not synonymous with equality. Differences in bargaining power and economic capacity raise the question, “Is this truly fair reciprocal trade for Indonesia, or is it actually a reciprocal risk that could potentially create new inequalities?”

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP and the signing of the Bylaws need to be analyzed based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, as affirmed in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter. This principle places every country on equal footing legally. However, this normative equality does not necessarily reflect factual equality in practice. When examined through the principle of reciprocity in trade agreements, it must be interpreted as proportional reciprocity, not merely textual symmetry. The balance of power doctrine in geopolitical practice has the potential to influence state policy. From a constitutional perspective, Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia stipulates that international agreements that have broad and fundamental impacts on the lives of the people must obtain the approval of the House of Representatives (DPR). Article 33, paragraphs 2 and 3 affirm state control over important branches of production and strategic resources for the prosperity of the people. Indonesia’s participation in the BoP and signing of the Bylaws will create legal obligations that limit national policy space and significantly reduce Indonesia’s economic flexibility. This engagement will create a new geopolitical architecture deemed inconsistent with the doctrine of an independent and active foreign policy that has long been Indonesia’s constitutional identity.

An entity can be categorized as a formal international organization if it is established through a multilateral agreement that creates its own permanent structure, organs, and legal capacity. The geopolitical perspective on the BoP’s interoperability deserves careful analysis. Does this forum function as a new architecture that reflects a particular configuration of global power? Without analyzing this, Indonesia’s involvement cannot be viewed merely as technocratic participation and impacting a shift in strategic orientation in international relations.

Moch Rizky Adi Pratama Putra, Erny Herlin Setyorini 

University 17 Agustus 1945 Surabaya