The Constitutionality Of Regulating Preaching In Commercial Vehicles Under The FRSC (Amendment) Bill, 2026: A Case For Reasonable Regulation Rather Than Absolute Prohibition -By Jacob Shekwobashawye Samuel

ABSTRACT
The Federal Road Safety Corps (Amendment) Bill, 2026 represents one of the most significant legislative efforts in recent years to strengthen Nigeria’s legal framework for road traffic administration, public safety, and the orderly use of highways.

Among its proposed reforms is a provision imposing sanctions on persons who engage in preaching inside commercial vehicles.
This provision has generated intense public debate. While some have described it as unconstitutional and an infringement of the freedoms of religion and expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), others view it as a legitimate regulatory measure aimed at enhancing road safety.

This Article argues that the National Assembly possesses the constitutional competence under Section 4(2) of the Constitution to enact laws regulating activities capable of endangering road users or disrupting the orderly use of public highways. It further contends that constitutional rights, though fundamental, are not absolute. By virtue of Section 45(1) of the Constitution, the exercise of certain rights may be reasonably regulated where such regulation is necessary in the interests of public safety, public order, public health, public morality, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The article therefore submits that a carefully tailored regulation of organised preaching within commercial vehicles is not, without more, unconstitutional.

1.0 THE PURPOSE OF THE BILL: ROAD SAFETY AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVE

Every statute must be interpreted in light of the purpose for which it was enacted. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Nnaduaka v. Anunobi (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 65, emphasising that legislation should be construed in a manner that advances the legislative intention rather than defeats it.

The Federal Road Safety Corps Act was enacted principally to promote safer highways, reduce road traffic accidents, regulate the use of public roads, and protect lives and property. The proposed amendment seeks to reinforce that statutory framework by modernising penalties, improving compliance with traffic regulations, and strengthening the enforcement powers of the Federal Road Safety Corps.
Viewed from that perspective, the provision regulating hawking, trading, and preaching inside commercial vehicles should not be examined in isolation. It forms part of a broader legislative policy directed at ensuring safer, more orderly, and more efficient public transportation.

Commercial vehicles are designed primarily for the safe conveyance of passengers from one destination to another. They are not intended to function as mobile marketplaces, campaign platforms, or organised venues for religious assemblies. Activities capable of distracting drivers, obstructing passenger movement, creating unnecessary congestion within vehicles, or provoking disputes among passengers may legitimately attract legislative regulation where they pose a real risk to public safety.

The Constitution empowers the National Assembly to enact laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Federation. It necessarily follows that Parliament may prescribe reasonable standards governing conduct within commercial vehicles where such standards are rationally connected to the protection of lives and property.

Accordingly, the objective pursued by the amendment is, in principle, a legitimate governmental objective. The constitutional challenge does not arise from the purpose of the Bill itself, but from whether the legislative response is sufficiently balanced, comprehensive, and proportionate to the broader realities of road safety in Nigeria.

2.0 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO REASONABLE REGULATION

Much of the criticism directed against the Federal Road Safety Corps (Amendment) Bill, 2026 is founded upon Section 38 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), which guarantees every person the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to manifest and propagate religious beliefs through worship, teaching, practice and observance.

That constitutional guarantee is undoubtedly one of the defining features of Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. Freedom of religion, like every other fundamental right, occupies a privileged position under the Constitution and is indispensable to the preservation of human dignity and democratic governance. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not envisage a system in which individual liberties are exercised without regard to the rights of others or the collective interests of society. Constitutional rights are therefore fundamental, but they are not absolute.

The Constitution itself recognises this limitation. Section 45(1) expressly empowers the National Assembly to enact laws restricting the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 where such restrictions are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. Accordingly, the Constitution does not merely confer rights; it simultaneously provides the constitutional framework within which those rights may lawfully be regulated in appropriate circumstances.

The Nigerian Courts have consistently affirmed this constitutional position. In Hassan v. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 607, the Court of Appeal held that fundamental rights are not absolute and may be curtailed by the appropriate authorities where constitutionally recognised grounds exist for doing so. The Court recognised that the Constitution itself contemplates circumstances in which rights such as personal liberty and freedom of movement may lawfully be restricted in accordance with due process and the provisions of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle. In Lagos State Government v. Abdulkareem (2022) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1859) 213, the Court held that by virtue of Section 45 of the Constitution, the rights guaranteed under Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 are not absolute but may lawfully be restricted where such restriction is reasonably justifiable in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons.

Significantly, while interpreting the constitutional right to freedom of religion under Section 38(1), the Supreme Court observed:
“The right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion implies a right not to be prevented, without lawful justification, from choosing the course of one’s life fashioned on what one believes in, and a right not to be coerced into acting contrary to one’s religious belief. The limits of these freedoms, as in all cases, are where they impinge on the rights of others or where they put the welfare of society or public health in jeopardy.”

This pronouncement succinctly captures the constitutional balance between individual liberty and the public interest. The Constitution protects religious belief and the freedom to manifest it, but it equally recognises that the exercise of that freedom must not undermine public safety, public health, public order or the constitutional rights of other persons. Thus, freedom of religion does not confer an unrestricted licence to exercise religious practices in every place, at every time and in every manner regardless of their consequences.

The same constitutional doctrine was reaffirmed in Ezeigbo v. Asco Investment Ltd. (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1832) 367 and more recently in Olakehinde v. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (2025) 17 NWLR (Pt. 2014) 241, where the Supreme Court reiterated that although fundamental rights enjoy constitutional protection, they remain subject to the limitations expressly recognised by Section 45 of the Constitution.

Likewise, in Mitin v. Commissioner of Police, Bayelsa State (2023) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1898) 259, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the constitutional rights to private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of movement guaranteed under Sections 37 to 41 of the Constitution are not absolute. The Court further affirmed that those rights may be derogated from or limited by a valid Act of the National Assembly enacted pursuant to Section 45 of the Constitution.

These decisions leave little room for the argument that every statutory regulation affecting religious activities is automatically unconstitutional. The constitutional question has never been whether a restriction exists. Rather, the decisive inquiry is whether the restriction is authorised by law, pursues a legitimate governmental objective, bears a rational connection to that objective, and is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

Viewed against this constitutional framework, the Federal Road Safety Corps (Amendment) Bill, 2026 cannot be condemned merely because it regulates organised preaching within commercial vehicles. If the legislative objective is to minimise driver distraction, preserve order within commercial vehicles, protect passengers, and enhance road safety, the National Assembly is constitutionally competent to regulate such conduct under Sections 4(2) and 45(1) of the Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees every Nigerian the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion. It does not, however, guarantee an unrestricted right to exercise that freedom in every location or circumstance irrespective of the safety of other road users or the welfare of society. Commercial vehicles are public transportation facilities designed principally for the safe movement of passengers. Where organised activities conducted within those vehicles are reasonably perceived to create distractions, obstruct the orderly operation of public transport, or increase risks to passengers and road users, Parliament is constitutionally entitled to enact reasonable regulatory measures in furtherance of road safety.

This writer therefore respectfully submits that the constitutional debate ought not to focus on whether preaching itself may be regulated. The Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly answer that question in the affirmative where the requirements of Section 45 are satisfied.

3.0 THE BILL REGULATES CONDUCT RATHER THAN RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Perhaps the greatest misconception surrounding the amendment is the assertion that it criminalises Christianity or Islam. That characterisation does not accurately reflect the substance of the proposed legislation.

Nothing in the Bill prohibits attendance at churches or mosques. It does not prohibit evangelism, Da’wah, crusades, revivals, religious meetings, personal prayer, or any other lawful act of worship carried out in appropriate settings. Neither does it prohibit individuals from discussing matters of faith in ordinary conversation.
The Bill is directed only at one specific form of conduct—organised preaching inside commercial vehicles.

Importantly, the amendment also regulates hawking and trading within the same environment. Those activities bear no religious character. They have been grouped together because they involve organised conduct taking place within vehicles intended primarily for public transportation. The legislative focus is therefore on regulating activities within a particular setting rather than suppressing any religious doctrine or belief.

This distinction is constitutionally significant. Constitutional jurisprudence consistently recognises the difference between regulating a belief and regulating the manner in which conduct associated with that belief is exercised in a particular place or circumstance.

Jacob Shekwobashawye Samuel is a Senator of the 9th Legislative Assembly under the Law Students’ Association of Nigeria (LAWSAN).
He is a passionate law student with a strong commitment to legal scholarship and public discourse.
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