Forgotten Dairies
NATO Betrayed: Brib es, a Mistress, and a Polish Villa -By Fransiscus Nanga Roka
At least as far back as June 2014 and until December 2022, nearly a decade, the scheme impacted projects connected to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and at sites across Europe for the Defense Logistics Agency. But then why did it remain unnoticed all this time? You are limited to U.S. jurisdiction for conduct that occurs entirely abroad only by the thinnest of hooks: the defendants all had used WhatsApp, owned by Meta, based in California in a telephone call immediately initiating the wire-fraud charges.
This is not your average graft case, it is evidence that the pulsing organ of Western collective defense can be bought for a cash-stuffed envelope, a trip to Dubai, a kitchen renovation. The U.S. Department of Justice also unsealed an indictment on January 26, 2026 against Ralf Grywnow, 70, a German national and former procurement official with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) in Capellen; as well as Bahadir Hatipoglu,[50] 50, a Turkish defense-construction contractor living outside Klaipeda in Lithuania. Both men were detained on provisional warrants, Grywnow in Zagnansk, Poland, and Hatipoglu in Lithuania as Washington now seeks their extradition.
Who is responsible? Not just two men. It is a complete failure of oversight at NSPA, which oversees billions of dollars in logistics and construction contracts for NATO forces throughout Europe. According to the indictment, Hatipoglu bribed Grywnow with money poured directly into a bank account; an arrangement for sex with a woman in Dubai; and payment of construction costs and furnishing expenses for Grywnows private home in Poland. In return, Grywnow provided phony performance appraisals, rigged the system for contractor ratings that fed NATO contracts and leaked classified internal data from U.S. military construction tenders with NATO to help Hatipoglu secure Pentagon and NATO military contracts.
At least as far back as June 2014 and until December 2022, nearly a decade, the scheme impacted projects connected to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and at sites across Europe for the Defense Logistics Agency. But then why did it remain unnoticed all this time? You are limited to U.S. jurisdiction for conduct that occurs entirely abroad only by the thinnest of hooks: the defendants all had used WhatsApp, owned by Meta, based in California in a telephone call immediately initiating the wire-fraud charges. The most damning aspect of this situation, however, is that Grywnow wasn’t even a “foreign official” for the purposes of U.S. foreign bribery laws because NATO does not count as a public international organization under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and so his actions could not even be prosecuted in other words what does it say about how flimsy our international anti-corruption architecture if it can’t catch bribery by NATO officials?
How on earth did something like this happen again? And the worst part: This is not even the first time. But in 2025, the largest corruption scandal in its history brought NSPA to a halt by uncovering allegations of bribes and kickbacks amounting to millions of euros against it on 15 contracts, particularly for equipment manufactured by Israeli arms giant Elbit Systems. However, only two weeks after that summit in The Hague (in late March) and just two days before extraditions were due to be carried out, the DOJ unexpectedly withdrew all prosecution against those suspects. Are we to conclude from this pattern that international justice for NATO corruption rests not on the existence of any particular evidence, but on geopolitics?
Strategic recommendations: First, NATO should reform NSPA by creating an independent advisory board free from the control of member-state powers. Secondly, the member states should insist on extending international legal immunities of officials of multilateral organizations – for instance by narrowing the existing legal loophole that NATO is not to be considered a “public international organization” (under those definitions given in FCPA). Third, because of past politically-motivated dismissals in the Elbit-related case, Grywnow and Hatipoglu must be extradited transparently and without political pressure. Fourth, the evaluation systems of military contractors must be independently audited rather than left up to single procurements officials susceptible to bribery. In the absence of such reforms, the world largest military alliance will still provide fertile soil for corruption that threatens the very collective security it was founded to defend.
Fransiscus Nanga Roka
Faculty of Law University 17 August 1945 Surabaya and Managing Partner Law Firm Victorious Indonesia
